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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE'S STATUTE
OF FRAUDS FOR SALES OF GOODS
I.
INTRODUCTION
The Statute of Frauds provision of the Uniform Sales Act, as enacted
in Pennsylvania,1 was substantially the same as the original English Statute
of Frauds.2 Its purpose was the prevention of fraud in relation to the
enforcement of an alleged oral contract. The advocates of the statute argue
that it prevents the introduction of perjured testimony, and suggest further
that it acts as a deterrent against hasty action in that the formality of a
writing will prevent a person from legally obligating himself without a full
appreciation of the nature of his acts.3 The opponents of the statute contend
that it aids fraud by facilitating the breach of legitimate oral contracts.4
The enactment of the Sales article of the Uniform Commercial Code,
with its liberal statute of frauds provisions, has been hailed by many
authorities as the solution to the controversy.5 Yet, before enactment of
1. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 4, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 42 (repealed) (1915).
2. Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2 c. 3 (repealed).
3. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 275, at 4 (1950) ; FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW, The
Statute of Frauds 940, 943 (1947) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 505, at 629 (3d ed.
1960) ; Comment, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 75 (1962).
4. Burdick, A Statute For Promoting Fraud, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 273 (1916).
5. Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code - Sales; Should It Be Enacted?,
59 YALE L.J. 821 (1950). The author states at 829:
In the present writer's forthcoming treatise on the law of Contracts, one
entire volume is devoted to the statute of frauds and its extremely variable
application by the courts. This work involved the comparative study of some
thousands of cases in all jurisdictions, one result of which is that he can say
with assured confidence that the adoption of the Code provisions will not in the
least increase the difficulty of interpretation of the statute or the uncertainty of
its application.
Section 2-201 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE reads as follows:
Section 2-201. Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds.(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods
for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has
been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not in-
sufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the
contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of
goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of
the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiv-
ing it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of sub-
section (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its con-
tents is given within ten days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but
which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not
suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business
and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circum-
stances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has
made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments
for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading,
testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but the
[VOL. 11
1
Tate: The Uniform Commercial Code's Statute of Frauds for Sales of Good
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1966
WINTER 1966]
the sales article, it was opposed by some, in particular Professor Williston,
who called it "not only iconoclastic but open to criticisms that I regard so
fundamental as to preclude the desirability of enacting this part [Sales],
at least, of the proposed Code."6 He considers section 2-201 as one of the
"most iconoclastic in the Code."' 7
The Code makes some changes in the formal requirements for enforce-
ability of a contract for the sale of goods at a price or value of $500 or
more. The chief purposes in view are these: first, to make the formal
requirements more definite and more easily applied; secondly, to make
the repudiation of genuine contracts less likely to be successful, while at
the same time increasing in no way the probability of successful fraud.8
The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent the enforcement of
alleged promises that never were made; it is not, and never has been, to
justify contracting parties in repudiating promises that were in fact made.9
This comment will analyze the problems presented by the Statute of
Frauds under the Sales Act and the impact of section 2-201 of the Code
on these problems.
II.
SCOPE OF SECTION 2-201
This section of the Code deals only with the sale of goods. Section
2-105 defines "goods" as "all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale, other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment
securities (Article 8) and things in action."' 0 The Statute of Frauds pro-
vision of the Uniform Sales Act applied to "a contract to sell or a sale of
any goods or choses in action of the value of $500 or upwards."" Thus,
it readily appears that the Statute of Frauds provision of the Code is more
restrictive than that of the Sales Act. Section 4 of the Sales Act covered
the sale of any goods or choses in action,12 while section 2-201 of the
Code is limited to the sale of goods.' 8 Some choses in action are within
contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of
goods admitted; or(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or
which have been received and accepted (Sec. 2-606).
6. Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63
HARV. L. Rv. 561 (1950).
7. Id. at 573.
8. Corbin, supra note 4, at 829.
9. Ibid.
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105(1), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-105(Supp. 1964).
11. UNIFORM SALES ACT, § 4, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 42 (repealed) (1915).
12. Some things held to be choses in action under the Sales Act were: a contract
right in an exclusive sales agency, Continental Collieries v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631(3d Cir. 1942) ; corporate stock, Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Trustees, 41 Lanc.L.R. 111 (Pa. C.P. 1928); and an interest in a partnership, Conrad v. Ehrhart, 63
York 33 (Pa. 1949).
13. In Demuth v. Robling, 55 Lack. Jur. 197 (Pa. 1954), it was held that the
Statute of Frauds provision of the Code was not applicable to a deceased partner's
interest in a partnership.
COMMENTS
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss2/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the coverage of section 8-31914 in the investment securities article and
section 9-203, dealing with secured transactions; any remaining choses,
ostensibly, had been excluded from Statute of Frauds limitations under
the Sales provisions.1 When the draftsmen learned that undocumented
choses (e.g., simple contract rights) were not covered by the Code's specific
provisions, they prepared section 1-206 to provide for choses in action not
otherwise regulated. 16 This section has a high value limit in that only trans-
actions in excess of $5,000 must be evidenced by a written memorandum.
Under both the Sales Act and the Code, contracts for the sale of
goods must be distinguished from contracts for work, labor and services.
As illustrated by cases concerning contracts for affixing specified objects
to realty, such as the installation of identified fixtures, the distinction was
difficult. Where services are to be performed and goods furnished under
the same contract, the courts must decide which aspect of the contract is
dominant. In Farr v. Zeno,17 the vendor agreed to furnish and install a
generator of good workmanship; the court found the transaction to be a
sale of goods within the coverage of the Sales Act, and consequently the
vendor's action to recover the price of the generator was defeated by the
breach of warranty created under another section of the Sales Act. Three
years later, in York Heating Co. v. Flannery,18 an action of assumpsit to
recover the balance due under a contract for the furnishing and erection
of a heating system for a new building, the same court distinguished Farr
v. Zeno by stating that: "Where a dealer sells a machine and the setting
up or installation is but incidental to the sale, the Sales Act applies; but
where, as here, the contract is really a building or construction agreement,
and the furnishing of materials and apparatus is merely an incident thereto,
the Sales Act has no application." The Code continues this policy by
stating, in section 2-102: "Unless the context otherwise requires, this
article applies to transactions in goods." In the case of Stone v. Krylon,
Inc.,19 decided subsequent to the enactment of the Code in Pennsylvania,
the court was confronted with this problem. The defendant corporation
had promised the plaintiff orally that if he would aid defendant in develop-
ing a satisfactory special product for coating asbestos shingles, defendant
would grant him the exclusive distributorship for the product throughout
the United States for a minimum period of ten years. Defendant also
agreed to sell plaintiff certain quantities of the product which plaintiff
14. In Kessler v. Green Co., 110 Pitts. L.J. 168 (Pa. 1962), a contract for the
sale of securities was held to be within the Statute of Frauds in the article on Invest-
ment Securities (§ 8-319) ; while, in In re Carter's Claim, 390 Pa. 365, 134 A.2d 908(1957), it was held that article 2 did not govern the sale of corporate stock. Also,
there was dicta indicating that article 2 may be applied to sales of stock if theprovisions of article 8 do not cover the situation and that the provisions of article 2
are applicable by analogy.
15. Comment, 58 DICK. L. Riv. 373, 374 (1954).
16. 1 HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GuID TO THS UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODe 23 (1964).
17. 81 Pa. Super. 509 (1923).
18. 87 Pa. Super. 19 (1926).
19. 141 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
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had helped to develop, the total purchase price being in excess of $500.
After the plaintiff had successfully developed the product, the defendant
refused to grant plaintiff the distributorship for the product and further
refused to ship plaintiff any amount of the product. In defense to an
action on the oral contract, the defendant moved to dismiss on the Statute
of Frauds because the contract involved a sale of goods in excess of $500.
The court, in denying defendant's motion, held that the contract was not
for the sale of goods, but rather was a contract of employment, the
franchise being the consideration for the services, and delivery of the goods
part performance of the defendant's obligations. 20
A recent case, decided under a different Statute of Frauds section
(8-319),21 has reached a result inconsistent with that of Stone. In Kessler
v. Green Co.,2 2 plaintiff had agreed orally to promote and obtain a public
offering of defendant corporation's stock in exchange for a promise that
plaintiff would receive an option to purchase 7,500 shares of the stock of
defendant corporation at the book value as of the date he secured a broker
to handle the public sale. The court, after reciting the Statute of Frauds
concerning "a contract for the sale of securities," stated: "The complainant
in this case alleges facts which bring the action within the Statute of
Frauds. There is a contract relating to the sale of securities; it is not in
writing. '23 This rendered the contract unenforceable.
An attempt to reconcile this decision with that in Stone v. Krylon,
Inc., presents a most difficult task. The official comment to section 8-319
states the purpose of that section to be: "To conform the Statute of Frauds
provisions with regard to securities to the policy of the provisions in the
Article on Sales or sale of goods. '2 4 In Anderson's treatise on the Code,
the author comments on section 8-319:
Although the Code treats securities and goods separately, the
Statute of Frauds provision applicable to securities is patterned to a
large extent upon the statute of frauds applicable to goods. Where
there is an identical or similar provision in the two, it is to be ex-
pected that the courts will give a similar construction to both.25
Alternative considerations for analyzing the case present themselves.
The court may have been mistaken in the application of the Code to the
facts; or perhaps this case manifests a tendency to effect an expansion
which would bring contracts relating to the sale of securities within the
scope of the Code provisions. If the latter, could it be that a court when
faced with a Stone v. Krylon, Inc., situation in a sales context would reach
20. For a similar discussion of Stone v. Krylon, Inc., see Note, 15 SYRACUSr L.
REv. 532, 535 (1964).
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE art. 8, Investment Securities § 8-319; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12A, § 8-319 (Supp. 1964).
22. 110 Pitts. L.J. 168 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
23. Id. at 169.
24. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-319, official comment under "Purposes of
Changes," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 8-319 (Supp. 1964).
25. 2 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 48 (1961).
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a different result, by interpreting a contract for the sale of goods as en-
compassing also a contract relating to a sale of goods?
After the initial determination that a particular transaction is within
the scope of section 2-201, problems may still arise as to the interpreta-
tion of the provisions of that section. Keeping in mind the section's pur-
pose of providing sufficient evidence that a contract has been made, this
comment proceeds to a discussion of the methods of satisfying the Statute
of Frauds. The code continues the primary method which requires a
sufficient memorandum but expands this for transactions between mer-
chants. A writing in confirmation of their contract and sufficient against
the sender to satisfy the statute suffices if not objected to within ten days
after receipt.
Satisfaction by partial payment or receipt and acceptance of any part of
the goods is continued, but with new limitations, while an admission that a
contract has been made by the party against whom enforcement is sought, in
his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court is a novel statutory provision.
The final provision to be treated is that which removes specially
manufactured goods from the proscriptions of the statute. While the
previous modes of satisfying the statute depended upon acts of the parties,
this last method arose merely from the substantive matter of the contract.
The Code changes this somewhat by adding the requirement that the
seller take one of several steps toward performance.
III.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE MEMORANDUM
Under the Sales Act, an oral contract was enforceable only if evidenced
by "some note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale . . .
signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf." 26 The Sales
Act did not specify the completeness required of the memorandum, but
many courts required a completely integrated memorandum of all the
essential terms. However, some courts did not require that the memoran-
dum be contained in a single writing. Several documents sufficed as long
as they were connected by internal references to each other; the party to
be charged had signed one of them; and together they indicated an intent
to contract.27 A memorandum which merely recognized that a contract had
been executed would not satisfy the statute.28 The names of the parties,
the quantity and kind of the goods sold, the time of delivery and the terms
of the sale have all been described as essential terms of the contract. 29 The
26. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 4; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 42 (repealed) (1915).
27. Swift & Co. v. Meehan, 283 Pa. 429, 129 Atl. 324 (1925) ; Paturzo v. Ferguson,
280 Pa. 379, 124 Atl. 481 (1924) ; for similar cases, see Comment, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 75,
77 (1962).
28. Vitro Mfg. Co. v. Standard Chem. Co., 291 Pa. 85, 139 Atl. 615 (1927);
Stein v. Camden Fibre Mills, 148 Pa. Super. 348, 25 A.2d 741 (1942); for similar
cases, see PA. BAR ASS'N NOTXS; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-201.
29. Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Spruks, 3 Pa. D.&C. 87 (C.P. 1923).
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case of Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Howell"° is in point. The plaintiff
sought recovery under a contract for the sale of sugar which the defendant
had refused to accept. The sales memorandum signed by the agent of the
defendant stated the parties to the contract, the quantity of the goods
sold, and the terms of delivery, but, although appearing in a column labelled
price were the numerals 22.50, the court found this inadequate as a price
term and held the memorandum insufficient to satisfy Section 4 of the
Sales Act, stating:
A writing is insufficient as a memorandum where it does not
state any (all) of the terms of the contract; where it omits or states
incompletely a single essential term; where it merely refers to the
contract without stating its terms, or where it shows expressly or
inferentially that there are terms which it either does not state or does
not clearly and sufficiently state.31
The Code, in part, follows the pattern of the Sales Act in requiring
a writing for the enforcement of sales for $500 or more but, in contrast
to the Sales Act, is very liberal in defining what constitutes a sufficient
writing. Section 2-201 (1) requires only that the writing (1) indicate that
a contract of sale has been made between the parties, (2) be signed by
the party against whom enforcement is sought, and (3) specify the quantity
of goods sold.3 2 The official comment to this section states:
The required writing need not contain all the material terms of the
contract, and such material terms as are stated need not be precisely
stated. All that is required is that the writing afford a basis for
believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction....
It need not indicate which party is the buyer and which the seller.
The only term which must appear is the quantity term which need not
be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the amount stated. The
price, time, and place of payment or delivery, the general quantity of
the goods, or any particular warranties may all be omitted.38
The purpose of this change is to limit the use of the statute as a defense
to cases where there is a definite possibility of fraud, by abolishing the
prior rigid, inflexible rules developed by case law under the Sales Act.3 4
The Code proceeds upon the theory that the memorandum should be
sufficient if it reasonably proves the existence of the contract and shows
enough of its terms to permit fair enforcement.8 5 Reasonable proof of the
30. 274 Pa. 190, 118 At. 109 (1925).
31. Id. at 200, 118 Atl. at 113.
32. As stated in § 2-201 (1) : "A writing is not insufficient because it omits or
incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under the
paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing."
33. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, official comment pt. 1; PA. S'rAT. ANN.
tit. 12A, § 2-201. See also, Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co., 396 Pa. 506,
153 A.2d 472 (1959).
34. Comment, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 75, 78 (1962).
35. This provision is consistent with other sections of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE that refuse to make contracts unenforceable because certain material terms are
omitted, such as § 2-305 relating to open price contracts and § 2-311 relating to
COMMENTS
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existence of the contract is assured by section 2-201 (1), and, given the quan-
tity term, a court can fairly construct the omitted terms for these are often
matters readily ascertainable from course of dealing and usage of trade.36
Given the facts of Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Howell, a court, apply-
ing section 2-201 of the Code, would reach a contrary result. Not only
did the defendant admit the existence of the memorandum in his testimony
(which would be sufficient for enforcement under section 2-201(3) (b))
but the memorandum included the quantity of goods sold (50 barrels),
which element would, of itself, make the contract enforceable under the
Code. The court, using the basis of 22.50 referred to in the memorandum,
or by using a reasonable market price in the trade, could reach a result more
just than the court's act of declaring the entire contract unenforceable.3 7
By requiring "some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract
for sale has been made between the parties," section 2-201 assures the
existence of the contract. In Arcuri v. Weiss,"' the court in construing
this provision required adequate information to convince the court that the
oral agreement was final and complete. During negotiations for the pur-
chase by plaintiff of defendant's restaurant, the plaintiff gave a check to
the defendant as a deposit on the sale. The check contained a marginal
notation, "tentative deposit on tentative purchase of 1415 City Line Ave-
nue, Philadelphia Restaurant, Fixtures, Equipment, Goodwill." Plaintiff,
losing interest in the sale, demanded a return of his check, which the
defendant refused on the ground that there was a binding contract. The
court, in finding for the plaintiff, held that the memorandum was insuffi-
cient to indicate a final agreement between the parties stating: "While it
(section 2-201) does not require a writing which embodies all the essential
terms of the contract, and even goes so far as to permit omission of the
price, it does require some writing which indicates that a contract for
sale has been made."8 9
As previously mentioned, section 2-201 retains the requirement of the
Sales Act that the memorandum be "signed by the party against whom
contracts leaving open the particulars of performance. Obviously, if these terms may
be omitted from an enforceable written contract, they should not have to be included
in a memorandum which, by definition, seems to connote something less inclusive than
the contract it purports to note. HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 25.
36. HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 25.
37. It is obvious that the price term could have been ascertained readily if the
court had gone beyond the four corners of the memorandum. The court, when con-
struing the phrase "basis 22.50," remarked:
The dollar mark is not used, and was not intended to be (used) ; admittedly
the price was to be 22Y2 cents for each pound of sugar in each barrel purchased.
Ordinarily, if this was intended, it would be written 222 cents, or .225. We
therefore start out with the fact that an important term of the contract cannot
be ascertained from the paper alone, if its words are to be given their usual
significance.
Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Howell, supra note 30, at 196, 118 Atd. at 112. It is
submitted that the court had before it sufficient evidence of a reasonable price to
place upon the goods.
38. 198 Pa. Super. 506, 184 A.2d 24 (1962) ; see Note, 15 SYRAcus4 L. REv.
532, 538 (1964).
39. Arcuri v. Weiss, supra note 38, at 510, 184 A.2d at 26.
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enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. ' 40 A significant
change in the satisfaction of the memorandum requirements has been
enacted by section 2-201(2).41 Between merchants, this section obviates
the requirement of a memorandum signed by the party sought to be charged.
The purpose of the section is to rectify a situation that readily could aid
a fraudulent buyer. If a buyer and seller made an oral contract of sale,
it was usual for the seller to send a letter of confirmation to the buyer.
Under the Sales Act, the buyer had the benefit of the letter as a memo-
randum to enforce the contract, while, if the buyer chose to breach, the
seller had nothing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Under section 2-201 (2),
if the buyer fails to object to the letter within ten days, his silence pre-
cludes his use of the Statute of Frauds defense. This gives the seller a
substantially equal status in the transaction. The burden of proving that
a contract was made is not affected by this subsection, and, thus, will be
of limited assistance to those trying to use it to perpetrate fraud. A
fraudulent party who sends out a letter of confirmation when no oral
agreement has been made could use 2-201(2) to deprive a buyer of the
Statute of Frauds defense, but he could not recover against that party until
he proved the existence of the contract.42
In Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co.,43 the court held that
a memorandum consisting of a purchase order on the seller's form signed
by the purchaser, and a letter from the purchaser to the seller requesting
an order similar to that on seller's form was sufficient to satisfy the Statute
of Frauds. The court found that the memoranda were a sufficient "basis
for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction. ' 44
IV.
PARTIAL PAYMENT
Under the Sales Act, an oral contract, otherwise unenforceable because
of the Statute of Frauds, was enforceable if one of the parties gave "some-
40. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(1); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 201 (1)
(Supp. 1964). In Frye Safety, Inc. v. Yerger Bros., 56 Lanc. L.R. 311 (Pa. C.P.
1958), a writing was held sufficient to satisfy § 2-201 despite the absence of the
seller's signature because enforcement was sought against the buyer whose signature
was present.
41. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(2). "Between merchants if within a
reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the
sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it
satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice
of objection to its contents is given within ten days after it is received. Compare the
effect of failure to comply under § 2-207. See § 2-104(1) for definition of "merchant."
42. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, official comment pt. 3.
43. 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959).
44. Id. at 512, 153 A.2d at 476; see also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201
comment under "Purposes of Changes 1"; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-201 (1964
Supp.). In Wickersham E.&C. Co. v. Arbutus Steel Co., 58 Lanc. L.R. 164 (Pa.
C.P. 1962), the court found that a memorandum failed as a confirmation because it
did not refer to any prior oral contract and its use of words of future intent failed to
bind the sender. In addition, the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant had
received the memorandum. The alleged memorandum, therefore, was found insufficient
as to each of the four basic requisites of § 2-201(2). HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra
note 16, at 26 n.25.
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thing in earnest to bind the contract or in part payment." 45 Partial pay-
ment was a total bar to the Statute of Frauds defense, thus rendering the
entire contract enforceable. 46
Section 2-201(3) (c) deals with the same problem but makes the
contract enforceable only "with respect to goods for which payment has
been made and accepted." The theory of the modification is that payment
speaks of a contract with respect to only those goods for which payment
has been made. The remaining portion is unenforceable, since there is no
evidence of contract obligations beyond the actual performance.47 The
result is that the Code severs that part of the transaction for which pay-
ment has been made from that part for which it has not. Partial payment
by the buyer and acceptance of the same by the seller is an overt admission
by both parties that a contract actually exists. 48 The contract will be
enforced to the extent of the apportionable part of the goods. 49
A question remains as to the extent of enforcement where it is im-
possible to apportion the goods in direct relation to the value of the
payment that has been made. If part payment has been made on an in-
divisible contract, the buyer cannot enforce the contract but is limited
to a recovery of his payment. 50 A recent Pennsylvania case 5' is illustra-
tive of this problem. The seller orally agreed to sell two vats (purchase
price $1,600) with the buyer paying $100 on account. When the buyer
refused to accept the vats, the seller sued for breach of the oral agreement.
The buyer asserted section 2-201 as a defense to the action but the seller
contended that the payment of the $100 by the buyer brought him within
the exception to the Statute of Frauds (section 2-201(3) (c)). The court
refused to enforce the contract, holding that the Code "denies enforcement
of the contract where in the case of a single object the payment made is
less than the full amount."'52
Although the case follows subsection 2-201(3) (c), one authority,
in commenting on the case, 53 has suggested what would seem to be a more
45. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 4(1) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 42 (repealed) (1915).
46. H. Feldman's Sons Co. v. Netsky, 348 Pa. 237, 35 A.2d 305 (1944) ; Emco
Supply Co. v. Glover, 47 Sch. L.R. 24 (Pa. C.P. 1950).
47. REPORT OF, THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65(c), at 371 (1955).
48. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, comment pt. 2. Admittedly, this may
not be a sales contract, but it is evidence that a contract has been made.
49. Ibid. ". . . [I]f the price has been paid, the seller can be forced to deliver an
apportionable part of the goods." The accuracy of this official comment is subjected
to serious doubt by § 2-716 which specifies those instances when a buyer is entitled
to specific performance. See also comment 2 to the latter section which clarifies the
statutory language by giving specific examples of situations which are appropriate for
specific performance.
50. It is just this result that has caused Professor Corbin to prefer the old
Statute of Frauds or a complete abolition of the statute. See Corbin, The Uniform
Commercial Code - Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 831 (1950).
51. Williamson v. Martz, 11 Pa. D.&C. 33, 29 Northumb. L.J. 32 (C.P. 1956).
52. Id. at 34, 11 Pa. D.&C.2d at 35.
53. Hawkland, op. cit. supra note 16, at 29.
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suitable result. The payment of the $100 indicates that the oral agreement
rests on a real transaction. Since the buyer could not use part of a vat,
the contract contemplated at least one vat; the court, therefore, could
safely enforce the contract to the extent of one vat, and give the seller
a recovery of $800.
V.
ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT
The Sales Act gave to "acceptance and receipt of part of the goods
sold" the same effect as part payment.5 4 If the buyer accepted part of the
goods sold the entire contract would be enforceable. Under the Code,
acceptance and receipt of part of the goods makes the contract enforceable
only "with resepct to goods... which have been received and accepted." 55
This change is based on reasoning identical to that concerning part pay-
ment, that is, acceptance of part of the goods is evidence of a contract
only with respect to the goods received. Again, there is no evidence of
a contract more extensive than that part actually performed.3
The problems of apportionment which arose in the preceding section
are not as difficult when concerned with receipt and acceptance. If the
buyer accepts part of the goods, the seller is entitled to an apportionable
part of the contract price.57 Such a partial enforcement of the oral agree-
ment requires proof of the whole agreement, for otherwise it is not
possible to make a just apportionment of price to the goods delivered. 58
VI.
ADMISSIONS
The Code adds a new method of satisfying the Statute of Frauds to
those contained in the Sales Act. Section 2-201(3) (b) provides that the
54. UNIFORM SALS ACT § 4(l) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 42 (repealed) (1915).
55. See Kerecman v. Diedrich, 1 Craw. 204 (Pa. C.P. 1960), for construction of
the § 2-201 (3) (c) provision for acceptance of goods.
56. See, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODX § 2-606, which describes the acts that con-
stitute acceptance of goods. Under the Sales Act, the Statute of Frauds provision(§ 4) had its own definition of acceptance (§ 4(3)).
57. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODZ § 2-201, comment pt. 2.
58. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 482, at 644 (1950). As the author states in a footnote
to this section:
Since even partial enforcement as this, requires oral proof of the terms of the
agreement, it seems to the present writer that the Code might as well have
followed the Sales Act and old section 17 by making the agreement fully enforce-
able. It is true, however, that under the Code provision, a plaintiff can no longer
fraudulently enlarge the transaction by perjured testimony as to the agreed amount.
His remedy is now limited to the part actually received by the other party.
COMMENTS
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss2/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
oral contract is enforceable "if the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a
contract for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this
provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted."'59 This section, although
not contained in the Sales Act, is not a completely novel provision. A case
decided under the Sales Act held that an oral agreement within the Statute
of Frauds would be enforced against a defendant, if defendant either
inadvertently or advertently, admited at trial the making of the oral
agreement.60 Under article 2 of the Code, any such admission is specifically
declared to be sufficient to enable enforcement of the contract.
The first case construing this section of the Code held that a demurrer
based on the Statute of Frauds defense does not constitute an admission
which will make the contract enforceable under the Code. 61 The court
indicated that this section applied only to responsive pleadings. A con-
trary result would eliminate the use of a demurrer as a basis for raising
the Statute of Frauds.
VII.
SPECIAL MANUFACTURING
Related to the earlier discussion of contracts for labor and services
is section 2-201 (3) (a) which provides for specially manufactured goods.
As stated in the section on the scope of 2-201, if the contract is for labor
and services it is not subject to the Statute of Frauds. But, even under
the Sales Act, ". . . if the goods are to be manufactured by the seller
especially for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the
ordinary course of the seller's business, the provisions of this section
[4(2)] shall not apply." Under the Sales Act special manufacturing was
exempted from Statute of Frauds requirements on the theory that it in-
volved work and labor.6 2 To make the contract enforceable on this basis,
two requirements had to be met: (1) the goods had to be manufactured
specially by the seller for the buyer; (2) the goods had to be such as
cannot be disposed of by the seller in the ordinary course of his business.
If these were present, the contract was one for labor and services and not
for a sale of goods. But difficulties were encountered when the seller
contracted with a third party to have the latter manufacture the goods for
the buyer. Since the goods were not being manufactured by the seller, one
of the requisites was lacking. The contract for this transaction was treated
as a sale of goods, and, thus, the Statute of Frauds became applicable.62
59. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-201(3)(b); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §
2-201(3)(b) (Supp. 1964).
60. Martin v. Wilson, 371 Pa. 529, 92 A.2d 193 (1952).
61. Beter v. Helman, 41 West. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1958). The demurrer stated: "The
petition shows on its face that the alleged contract is unenforceable by reason of the
statute of frauds."
62. HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 31.
63. The courts were consistent when interpreting the exception to the Statute of
Frauds under the Sales Act providing for specially manufactured goods, in holding
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Under the Code, the policy which exempts special manufacturing
arises because of the peculiarly vulnerable position of the special manu-
facturers. They are more seriously injured than other sellers when a
buyer reneges on his oral contract, because they are left with goods not
readily marketable. Therefore, they need more protection than ordinary
sellers.64 Subsection 2-201(3) (a) provides that an oral contract for the
price of $500 or more is unenforceable ". . . unless the goods are to be
specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others
in the ordinary course of the seller's business, and the seller . . . has made
either substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their
procurement." This section differs from the Sales Act in that it does not
require the seller to be the special manufacturer. It is enough if the
transaction involves special manufacturing. In requiring the seller to have
changed his position as a result of the oral contract, the draftsmen of the
Code are consistent in their approach. This recognizes that those selling
special goods need special protection only when they stand to be injured
more seriously than ordinary sellers by the renouncement of oral contracts.6 5
VIII.
CONCLUSION
The Code, although taking the same general approach to the Statute
of Frauds as did the Sales Act, has developed a more pratcical approach
to problems that arise under this provision. By relaxing the requirements
for a sufficient memorandum, and providing more specifically for the
exceptions to the memorandum, the Code's approach seems to fit more
easily into the present day commercial setting than did the Sales Act. The
memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Code is just that which would be used
by merchants in their everyday transactions. The exception for special
manufacturing is likewise brought in line with the business setting. Although
certain problems may still arise in this area, the Code gives the courts suffi-
cient discretion to reach a more equitable solution than did prior law.
Joseph A. Tate
that: "every part of the statute must be considered and, if possible, effect given to
every word, clause and sentence." Where the goods were not manufactured by the
seller, the courts held that the Statute of Frauds was not satisfied under the exceptionfor specially manufactured goods. Cf. Eagle Paper Box Co. v. Gatti-McQuade, 99Misc. Rep. 508, 164 N.Y. Supp. 201 (1917); Atlas Shoe Co. v. Rosenthal, 242 Mass.15, 136 N.E. 107 (1922); H. W. Myers and Son, Inc. v. Felopulos, 116 Vt. 364, 76
A.2d 552 (1950).
64. HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 31.
65. Ibid. For a discussion of the reasons against giving special manufacturers
this protection, see HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 31-32.
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